Playing for Pay or Playing to Play: Student-Athletes as Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act by Colwell, Christine
Louisiana Law Review 
Volume 79 
Number 3 Spring 2019 Article 12 
4-30-2019 
Playing for Pay or Playing to Play: Student-Athletes as Employees 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Christine Colwell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Christine Colwell, Playing for Pay or Playing to Play: Student-Athletes as Employees Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 79 La. L. Rev. (2019) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol79/iss3/12 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
  
Playing for Pay or Playing to Play: Student-Athletes 
as Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Introduction .................................................................................. 900 
I. Minimum Wage for College Play: The Fair Labor  
Standards Act and the National Collegiate  
Athletic Association ..................................................................... 904 
 A. Minimum Wage and a Safer Workplace: History of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act ................................................. 905 
B. The National Collegiate Athletic Association and the 
Development of Amateur Athletics ....................................... 910 
II. Student-Athletes as Employees Under the NLRA, 
Workers’ Compensation, and FLSA ............................................ 914 
 A. Student-Athletes Not Considered Employees 
Under Employment Statutes .................................................. 914 
 B. Berger, Dawson, and the Compensation of Student 
Athletes Under the FLSA ...................................................... 917 
 1. Running to the Bank: Berger v. NCAA ........................... 917 
 2. Concurring but Creating Instability ................................. 920 
 3. Running with Judge Hamilton’s Concurrence: 
Dawson v. NCAA ............................................................. 921 
III. Application of the Economic Reality Test to NCAA 
Division I Student-Athletes .......................................................... 925 
A. The Permanency of the Relationship of Student- 
Athletes and Their Respective Schools ................................. 925 
B. The Amount of the Worker’s Individual Investment in 
Facilities and Equipment ....................................................... 926 
C. The Opportunities for the Worker to Experience 
Profit and Loss ....................................................................... 928 
D. The Worker’s Skill and Initiative .......................................... 928 
E. The Nature and Degree of Control by the Employer ............. 929 
F. The Extent to Which the Work Performed is an  
Integral Part of the Employer’s Business .............................. 931 
G. Other Factors Necessary to Assess the  
Economic Reality ................................................................... 932 
IV. Deal or No Deal: Permit Student-Athletes to  
Pursue Endorsement Deals ........................................................... 933 




 A. Amend the FLSA and Develop a Concrete Definition 
and Test to Determine Who Qualifies as  
an FLSA Employee ............................................................... 934 
 B. Establish Trusts for Student-Athletes to Access After 
Graduation and the Exhaustion of Eligibility ........................ 936 
 C. Amend the NCAA Amateurism Policy and Allow 
Student-Athletes to Receive Endorsements ........................... 937 
 1. Compensation Based Directly on Athletic Abilities 
and Personal Success ....................................................... 938 
 2. Eliminating the Difficulty ............................................... 938 
 3. Complying with Title IX ................................................. 939 
 4. Student-Athletes Unable to Generate Income  
to Support Themselves .................................................... 941 
 Conclusion .................................................................................... 943 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The University of Oklahoma gave its quarterback, Baker Mayfield,1 a 
full scholarship2 covering tuition, books, and room and board, as well as 
an additional scholarship covering the full cost of attendance, which added 
up to $140,000 over the span of four years.3 Suppose, however, the 
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 1. Baker Mayfield, U. OKLA. ATHLETICS, http://www.soonersports.com/ 
ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209397188 [https://perma.cc/UV9N-SQAJ] (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 2. A full scholarship the University of Oklahoma amounts to roughly 
$30,000 an academic year. Bursar Services, U. OKLA., http://www.ou.edu/bursar 
/tuition_fees.html [https://perma.cc/Z2KD-YT3Y] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
This figure includes cost of tuition and fees for a non-resident student and an 
estimate of the amount needed for room, board, and books. Id. 
 3. The full cost of attendance is “calculated by an institutional financial aid 
office, using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees, 
room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses related to 
attendance at the institution.” Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: 
Preserving Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player 
Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 873 (2016). The full cost of attendance is 
currently awarded only to student-athletes at Division I institutions. Division I 
institutions can elect to award scholarships up to $5,000 per year to each 
individual athlete to cover the full cost of attendance but do not have to award the 
maximum amount. Id. The $140,000 total includes the $30,000 award for tuition 
as well as the $5,000 cost of attendance award calculated for four years. 




University owed an additional amount to Mayfield for being an employee 
of the University of Oklahoma—a minimum wage of $7.254 an hour. 
Hypothetically, this would mean that Mayfield would receive $44,000 in 
total compensation for the academic year, not including potential overtime 
pay.5 Mayfield would also receive tutoring, gear, and other benefits6 as a 
result of his classification as an employee of the University.7 This is the 
economic situation with which schools would be faced if student-athletes 
were classified as employees of their universities. In addition to the great 
financial burden on universities, scholars8 believe that allowing college 
athletes to be classified as employees would “diminish[] the value of an 
education,” and would shift student-athletes’ focus toward receiving 
compensation and away from attaining a college degree.9 Additionally, 
                                                                                                             
 4. Oklahoma Minimum Wage 2017-2018, MINIMUMWAGE.ORG, https:// 
www.minimum-wage.org/oklahoma [https://perma.cc/XE97-BYJZ] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019). 
 5. This figure estimates the amount of minimum wage earned at $7.25 an 
hour based on working 40 hours a week during a 30-week academic calendar year. 
Any overtime earned would be based on any hours worked over 40 hours in a 
week. Academic Calendar, U. OKLA. (Jan. 8, 2018, 9:06 AM), http://www.ou.edu 
/admissions/academic_calendar/fall-2017 [https://perma.cc/SK7U-QPJ2]. Over- 
time pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) is pay for any work over 
40 hours in a work week and must be at least time and a half of the employee’s 
regular pay rate. Wage and Hour Division, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www. 
dol.gov/whd/overtime_pay.htm [https://perma.cc/C63G-PFUR] (last visited Feb. 
7, 2019). 
 6. See sources supra note 5. 
 7. See generally Paul Daugherty, College athletes already have advantages and 
shouldn’t be paid, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.si.com/more-
sports/2012/01/20/no-pay [https://perma.cc/8PKN-JPL9]. 
 8. See, e.g., Ekow N. Yankah, Why N.C.A.A. Athletes Shouldn’t be Paid, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/sports/sporting-scene/why-
ncaa-athletes-shouldnt-be-paid [https://perma.cc/9HZS-EQAX]; Kristi Dosh, The 
Problems with Paying College Athletes, FORBES (June 9, 2011), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/06/09/the-problems-with-paying-college-athletes/#6 
d8cc4ce5f7c [https://perma.cc/6BAH-R6QA]; Malcolm Lemmons, College 
Athletes Getting Paid? Here are Some Pros and Cons, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 
29, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ college-athletes-getting-paid-
here-are-some-pros-cons_us_58cfcee0e4b07112b6472f9a [https://perma.cc/JJY6 
-UQNW].  
 9. Daugherty, supra note 7. Sixty-nine percent of the public oppose paying 
college athletes more money than they already receive to cover their college 
expenses. Jon Solomon, NCAA expert: 69 percent of public opposes paying college 
players, CBS SPORTS (June 25, 2014), https://www.cbssports.com/college-




industry professionals argue that the compensation of student-athletes 
would change the spirit of college sports10—the Saturday tailgates, March 
Madness, longtime traditions, and customs of collegiate athletics that have 
been in place for years would fade away.11 Paying student-athletes as 
employees would destroy the collegiate model that has been in place for 
decades.12 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) governs and 
enforces the mandatory regulations for student-athletes.13 The NCAA 
principle of amateurism prohibits student-athletes from receiving any 
compensation beyond academic or athletic scholarships.14 In 2016, a group 
of student-athletes brought suit, challenging NCAA amateurism and 
claiming to be employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).15 
In Berger v. NCAA, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA and therefore 
are not entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay.16 Judge Hamilton’s 
concurrence questioned the majority’s holding as applied to Division I 
athletes in revenue-generating sports, suggesting that student-athletes 
                                                                                                             
football/news/ncaa-expert-69-percent-of-public-opposes-paying-college-players/ 
[https://perma.cc/C54L-Q6Q8]. 
 10. Sara Ganim, Paying college athletes would hurt traditions, NCAA chief 
Emmert testifies, CNN (June 19, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/19/us/ncaa-
obannon-lawsuit-trial/index.html [https://perma.cc/V732-JZYA]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. “[F]our out of 10 people are less likely to watch or attend college games” 
if college athletes are compensated. Solomon, supra note 9. NCAA President 
Mark Emmert explains that the customs of college sports, such as the 
“camaraderie of game day, the tailgating, the atmosphere of a stadium packed 
with nearly 100,000 fans and the pride of cheering for a university team,” could 
all go away if we get rid of NCAA amateurism policies and pay student-athletes 
as employees. Ganim, supra note 10. 
 13. Division I Governance, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance?divi 
sion=d1 [https://perma.cc/6WDS-QB6Z] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); see also Scott 
A. Mitchell, Hit, Sacked, and Dunked by the Courts: The Need for Due Process 
Protection of the Student-Athlete in Intercollegiate Athletics, 19 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 733, 736 (1994). 
 14. Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism [https://perma.cc 
/VK7V-W4M5] (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 15. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 
2016); see also Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 
403 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 16. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290. 




should be employees.17 Berger alone creates uncertainty as to whether 
student-athletes are employees under the FLSA and whether courts can 
reconcile an employee classification with the NCAA amateurism rules. 
This Comment proposes that student-athletes of revenue-generating 
sports are not employees under the FLSA and should not receive minimum 
wage or overtime pay from schools. Recognizing student-athletes as 
employees creates serious issues for schools, such as the requirement to 
pay student-athletes minimum wage, compliance with Title IX,18 and 
challenges calculating which student-athletes should receive compensation 
and for which activities. A feasible solution to this predicament is to amend 
the NCAA amateurism rules to allow student-athletes to profit from outside 
revenue sources and endorsements.19 Student-athletes would be “self-
employed” once they commit to an institution and would generate revenue 
on their own behalves.20 Allowing student-athletes to benefit from 
endorsements ameliorates problems associated with classifying student-
athletes as employees.21 Additionally, permitting student-athletes to profit 
from their generated revenue would decrease litigation, provide clarity in 
                                                                                                             
 17. NCAA Division I institutions are required to sponsor a certain amount of 
sports, award financial grants to student-athletes, and follow the rules set out in 
the NCAA Division I Manual. Rohith A. Parasuraman, Unionizing NCAA 
Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 733 (2007); Berger, 
843 F.3d at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 18. Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 requires institutions 
receiving federal funding to provide equal opportunities and funding to males and 
females. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). Failure to comply with Title IX can result in 
the Office of Civil Rights pulling federal funding from a school. Id. If student-
athletes were employees, both males and females would have to be paid the same 
minimum wage and have the opportunity to earn pay for the same number of 
hours. Id. See also Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and 
Historical Review of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 
22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 326 (2012); see infra Part IV.C. 
 19. This Comment proposes amending the NCAA amateurism policies to 
allow student-athletes to receive endorsements, but not create a free-market 
situation in which players are recruited and paid their fair market value to attend 
a university as is currently proposed in Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
No. 14-cv-02758-CW (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014). 
 20. Self-employed in this context analogizes student-athletes to “independent 
and thriving contractors [and] small business owners.” Jayesh M. Rathod & 
Michal Skapski, Reimagining the Law of Self-Employment: A Comparative 
Perspective, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 159, 159 (2013). 
 21. See generally Michael A. Corgan, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept 
Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics 
Created by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating 
Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 415 (2012). 




determining student-athletes’ employment status, and establish a modern 
version of NCAA amateurism rules more in accord with the current state 
of collegiate athletics. 
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of FLSA and the 
NCAA. Part II explains how the NCAA prohibits student-athletes’ 
classification as employees and analyzes the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”) and workers’ compensation in relation to the NCAA 
amateurism principles barring student-athletes’ employee status. Part II 
also examines Berger v. NCAA and the uncertainty Judge Hamilton’s 
concurrence creates regarding the applicability of the protections of the 
FLSA to student-athletes. In addition, Part II addresses Dawson v. NCAA, 
a more recent suit brought in the wake of Berger. Part III concludes that 
under the “economic realities” test, student-athletes are not FLSA 
employees. Finally, Part IV offers three potential solutions to decrease the 
amount of litigation regarding the compensation of student-athletes. This 
Comment argues specifically that the best solution to decrease litigation is 
a revision of the NCAA amateurism policies, allowing student-athletes to 
profit from endorsements and outside revenue sources. 
I. MINIMUM WAGE FOR COLLEGE PLAY: THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
ACT AND THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 
The FLSA dramatically altered the American worker’s life in 1938.22 
Not only did the FLSA guarantee a minimum wage, but it also improved 
working conditions for many people.23 Individuals who petition to be 
covered employees24 under the FLSA can gain the benefits of employee 
status that would not otherwise be afforded to them.25 Student-athletes are 
unable to gain employment status under the FLSA because the NCAA 
does not allow student-athletes to be classified as employees.26 
                                                                                                             
 22. Anna P. Prakash & Brittany B. Skemp, Beyond the Minimum Wage: How 
the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Broad Social and Economic Protections Support 
Its Application to Workers Who Earn A Substantial Income, 30 ABA J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 367, 368 (2015). 
 23. Id. 
 24. A “covered employee” under the FLSA must be paid federal minimum 
wage and overtime rates for any work over 40 hours a week. Fact Sheet #14: 
Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T LAB. WAGE 
& HOUR DIVISION (July 2009), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/wh 
dfs14.htm [https://perma.cc/XR6C-K47H]. 
 25. Prakash & Skemp, supra note 22, at 368. 
 26. NCAA amateurism principles do not allow for student-athletes to be 
employees of the school they attend. Amateurism, supra note 14. 




A. Minimum Wage and a Safer Workplace: History of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act 
The FLSA is a federal employment act Congress passed in 1938 that 
regulates minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and child labor 
standards to ensure fair treatment of employees.27 The Act defines 
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee.”28 In an equally ambiguous fashion, 
the Act defines an employee as “any individual employed by an 
employer.”29 To qualify as an employee under the FLSA one must perform 
work for an employer;30 the FLSA does not define “work,” however.31 
Employees covered under the Act benefit from the assurance that they will 
be paid a guaranteed minimum salary and reasonable hours.32 
Federal Courts use various methods to determine if an individual is an 
employee under the FLSA.33 Although there is no single test courts must 
                                                                                                             
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); Prakash & Skemp, supra note 22, at 368; Daniel 
B. Abrahams et al., Introduction to The Fair Labor Standards Act, in EMPLOYER’S 
GUIDE TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 100 (1993). Under the FLSA, 
employers must pay employees no less than the minimum wage, currently set at 
$7.25 an hour. Id. Overtime must be paid at time-and-a-half of an employee’s 
regular pay rate for hours worked beyond 40 hours in a seven-day work week. Id. 
at 110. A covered employee under the FLSA is guaranteed a salary, a guaranteed 
minimum for services performed, and reasonable work hours. Sherrie Scott, What 
Are The Benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act?, CHRON, https://smallbus 
iness.chron.com/benefits-fair-labor-standards-act-2957.html [https://perma.cc/7 
GSK-WXSP] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 
 29. Id. § 203(e)(1). 
 30. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 
2016). This Comment uses the Meriam-Webster definition of “work”: an “activity 
that a person engages in regularly to earn a livelihood.” Work, MERIAM-WEBSTER 
ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/work [https: 
//perma.cc/4NDH-G2EB] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 31. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290. 
 32. Scott, supra note 27. “Prior to the FLSA’s enactment, working conditions 
were deplorable” and employees “worked long hours in unsafe environments,” 
“earn[ing] wages too small to secure even the most modest living standards.” 
Prakash & Skemp, supra note 22, at 368. 
 33. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals uses a four-factor test to 
guide courts, which asks “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire 
and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules 
or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and 
(4) maintained employment records.” Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 




apply,34 the Supreme Court “has instructed courts to construe the terms 
‘employee’ and ‘employer’ expansively, [but with some] limits.”35 Courts 
must assess the “totality of circumstances rather than on any technical 
label.”36 This totality of circumstances analysis requires the courts to look 
at the economic reality of the working relationship between employees and 
employers.37 Conducting a totality-of-circumstances analysis allows 
courts to consider whether the FLSA was intended to apply to a particular 
relationship.38 Congress intended for some relationships, but not all, to be 
characterized as “employment relationships” under the FLSA; it remains 
unclear whether Congress had student-athletes in mind in enacting the 
law.39 The United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) provides a list of 
relationships it does not classify as employment relationships, such as 
prison inmates, medical residents, and foster parents.40 If Congress had 
intended to include all employment relationships, Congress would not 
have produced a handbook detailing all of the relationships that are not 
provided coverage under the FLSA.41 
Although there is no rigid test, the “economic realities” test is the most 
widely used and accepted method to determine whether there is an 
economic relationship present; namely, it assesses whether an employer 
intended an employment relationship with a particular worker.42 The DOL 
                                                                                                             
704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). Courts may determine employee status as a 
determination of the circumstances of the whole activity. Id. 
 34. Abrahams et al., supra note 27, at 240. 
 35. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405 
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290, 295 (1985)). 
 36. Berger, 843 F.3d at 286. 
 37. Id. at 290. 
 38. Id. (citing Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 39. See generally Jonathan L. Israel, Repeat After Me: College Athletes Are 
Not School Employees Under the FLSA, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 6, 2017), https:// 
www.natlawreview.com/article/repeat-after-me-college-athletes-are-not-school-
employees-under-flsa [https://perma.cc/S5TR-2KGL]. 
 40. See Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook, Chapter 10 FLSA 
Coverage: Employment Relationship, Statutory Exclusions, Geographical Limits, 
U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z55B-J6K6]. 
 41. See generally id.  
 42. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947); see generally 
United States Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 2015 WL 4449086, at *1 (describing the economic 
realities test that has developed as an alternative to the common law control test). 




enumerates guiding factors for courts to determine the “economic reality” 
of the employment relationship: (1) the permanency of the relationship; 
(2) the amount of the worker’s individual investment and employer’s 
investment in facilities and equipment; (3) the opportunities for the worker 
to experience profit and loss; (4) the worker’s skill and initiative; (5) the 
degree of control by the employer; and (6) the extent to which the work is 
an essential part of the employer’s business.43 
The permanency or indefiniteness of a working relationship can 
suggest that an employment relationship exists and can dictate when the 
worker is an employee or an independent contractor.44 The more 
permanent the relationship, the more likely there is an employment 
relationship.45 The amount of work an individual invests in facilities, 
equipment, and tools, compared to the amount an employer invests, may 
also help determine whether an employment relationship exists.46 If an 
individual personally invests in tools and equipment to complete a job, it 
may signify that he is in business as an independent contractor and not an 
employee of the employer.47 Courts normally consider an independent 
contractor an employee if he has the ability to make managerial decisions 
and experience the effects of those decisions on profits and losses, as 
                                                                                                             
Although the common law control test was popular when drafting the FLSA, 
Congress did not include the test in the statute. Since the drafting, courts have shifted 
to applying the “economic realities” test. Id. “The U.S. Supreme Court has . . . 
indicated that there is no single rule or test for determining whether an individual is 
an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of the FLSA. The Court has 
held that it is the total activity or situation which controls.” Fact Sheet #13: 
Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T 
LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIVISION (July 2008), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/ 
compliance/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D6N-ZHR6]. 
 43. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42; see also Abrahams et al., supra note 27, 
at 240. The factors are a guideline and are not required to be followed by courts 
when analyzing an employment relationship. Id. 
 44. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. Independent contractors are not 
employees, are economically independent, and are in business for themselves. Id. 
See also Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(explaining that independent contractors often have fixed employment periods 
whereas employees usually have a continuous and indefinite relationship with an 
employer). 
 45. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. 
 46. Id. See also Chao v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 16 F. App’x 104, 
107 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that cable installers who had to provide their own 
trucks, specialized tools, uniforms, pagers, and automobile insurance were not 
employees, rather independent contractors). 
 47. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. 




opposed to a worker who does not make managerial decisions for a 
business.48 An independent contractor demonstrates independent business 
judgement and has specialized skills, granting him economic 
independence from a putative employer.49 An independent contractor’s 
specialized skills indicate that he is in business for himself, in contrast to 
an employee working for an employer.50 The more control an employer 
has over a worker—including the time and manner of the work to be 
performed—helps the courts determine whether an employment 
relationship exists.51 More control usually indicates the presence of an 
employer–employee relationship.52 Likewise, a worker is ordinarily found 
to be an employee if his performance or service is vital to the business’s 
success.53 In contrast, an independent contractor provides temporary 
services that do not generally impact a business’s overall profitability.54 
In addition to the DOL’s suggested factors, courts have developed a 
variety of multifactor tests to help with the “economic realities” analysis.55 
The Seventh and Second Courts of Appeals have articulated factors that 
are useful in determining the economic reality of employment 
relationships.56 Other circuits—like the Ninth Circuit—have strayed away 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. See also Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 810 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining 
that cake decorators working at a bakery had no control over advertising, quality 
of the work, quality of the cakes, ingredients in the cakes, and therefore no input 
or control of any determinants of profits of the business). 
 49. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. Independent contractors are not 
employees, are economically independent, and are in business for themselves. Id. 
See also Herman v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675 
(D. Md. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Chao, 16 F. App’x 104 (holding that cable installers 
were independent contractors due to their highly specialized skills and trade, 
similar to electricians and carpenters). 
 50. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. 
 51. Id. See also Dole, 875 F.2d at 810 (finding that having no control over 
decisions indicates a lack of an employment relationship). 
 52. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. One factor is not more indicative of an 
employment relationship and all factors must be assessed. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. See also Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 
1988) (holding that services provided by nurses constituted an integral part of the 
business—to provide health care—finding that the nurses were employees). 
 55. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 56. Id. at 290 (citing Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535–38 
(7th Cir. 1987)). In Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, the secretary sought 
declaration as a matter of law that migrant farm workers were employees of the 
farm. The seven factors the court used in determining whether migrant laborers 
were employees are: (1) the amount of control the landowner had over the migrant 




from any multifactor tests and have held that circumstances of the entire 
activity must be considered when making the ultimate determination of 
employee status.57 Each circuit is free to develop its own approach to 
determine if an employment relationship exists based on circumstances 
and factors that best fit best the factual situation.58 
To further assist the courts in determining whether an employment 
relationship exists, the DOL Field Operations Handbook (“FOH”) 
provides “interpretations regarding the employment relationship required 
                                                                                                             
workers; (2) the possibility for the migrant workers to receive profit and incur 
losses; (3) the degree of skill required from each worker; (4) the amount of capital 
the workers invested; (5) the permanency and duration of the relationship; (6) 
whether the service of the migrant workers was an integral part of the business; 
and (7) the economic dependence of the migrant workers on landowners. 
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535–38. In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, unpaid 
interns brought a class action suit against the motion picture distributor claiming 
compensation as employees. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, 811 F.3d 528, 536–
37 (2d Cir. 2015). The court listed the following factors as a non-exhaustive list 
to help determine if an intern is an employee: (1) the extent to which the intern 
understands there is no expectation of compensation; (2) the extent to which the 
internship provides training similar to what one would receive in an educational 
setting; (3) the extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal 
education program and course work; (4) the extent to which the internship 
accommodates the academic calendar; (5) the extent to which the internship’s 
duration is limited to provide the intern with beneficial learning; (6) the extent to 
which the intern’s work complements, rather than displaces, the work of paid 
employees; and (7) the extent to which the intern and the employer understand 
that the internship is conducted without promise of a paid job upon completion of 
the internship. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290 (citing Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37). The 
Second Circuit held that interns who brought a claim for employment status were 
not employees; they participated knowing that they would not be paid, and the 
internship was conducted primarily for educational and training purposes. Glatt, 
811 F.3d at 536–37. 
 57. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405–06 
(N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 58. See generally Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th 
Cir. 1991); Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984). 




for the [FLSA] to apply.”59 The FOH60 provides that college students who 
participate in extracurricular activities are not employees within the 
meaning of the FLSA because the DOL considers collegiate athletics an 
extracurricular activity in which participation is purely voluntary—an 
activity that the FLSA intends to exclude.61 Thus, according to the DOL, 
reasons unrelated to immediate compensation motivate participation in 
athletics, and participation does not qualify as sufficient “work” to qualify 
for minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA.62 The NCAA shares 
the same view as the DOL and also agrees that student-athletes are not 
employees under federal employment statutes.63  
B. The National Collegiate Athletic Association and the Development of 
Amateur Athletics 
When evaluating the economic reality of the employment relationship, 
courts must also consider the underlying policies of the NCAA controlling 
student-athletes’ status as employees.64 The NCAA makes, enforces, and 
interprets the rules preventing student-athlete compensation beyond any 
academic or athletic scholarships.65 President Theodore Roosevelt 
founded the NCAA in 1906 “to protect young people from the dangerous 
and exploitive athletics practices of the time” and to regulate the rules and 
                                                                                                             
 59. Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook, supra note 40. The 
DOL guidelines and handbook assisted courts in determining whether student-
athletes, interns, and prisoners were employees for FLSA purposes. See generally 
Berger, 843 F.3d at 291; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 405–06; Schumann v. Collier 
Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 
806 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 60. Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook, supra note 40. 
 61. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293. 
 62. Id. The majority decision in Berger looks at the DOL FOH as persuasive 
authority and uses its interpretation to determine that student-athletes are not 
employees under the act. Id. 
 63. See Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to union proposal, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-responds  
-union-proposal [https://perma.cc/N6RL-7HDW] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 64. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293. 
 65. Remy, supra note 63. 




competition of intercollegiate football.66 Gradually, the NCAA expanded 
its jurisdictional control to cover all intercollegiate athletic departments.67 
The NCAA’s jurisdictional control allows the organization to act as 
the governing body of member athletic departments and to enforce rules.68 
Member institutions elect to be part of the NCAA, which allows 
institutions to receive monetary support and guidance from NCAA, and  to 
propose regulations for all other member schools to adopt and follow.69 
Once a regulation is adopted, the NCAA ensures the compliance of all 
member institutions and departments.70 Noncompliance may result in 
NCAA sanctions,71 such as limiting the number of athletic scholarships a 
school can award or potentially banning coaches from coaching for a 
substantial amount of time.72 
The NCAA subdivides member institutions into three divisions—
Divisions I, II, and III73—based on the number of sports each school is 
able to support financially.74 Division I schools have the largest athletic 
                                                                                                             
 66. Dan Treadway, Why does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-treadway/johnny-manziel-ncaa-
eligibility_b_3020985.html [https://perma.cc/JS6A-V4TM]; National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com 
/topic/National-Collegiate-Athletic-Association [https://perma.cc/72UF-DVQ7] 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 67. See generally Gordon S. White, N.C.A.A. Telecast Rights on Football 
Struck Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09 
/16/sports/ncaa-telecast-rights-on-football-struck-down.html [https://perma.cc/H 
S8L-5H3Y] (explaining that the NCAA was operating as a “Classic Cartel” in the 
operation of controlling the number of television appearances each collegiate 
football team could participate in and the price for each appearance). 
 68. Division I Governance, supra note 13; see also Mitchell, supra note 13, 
at 736. 
 69. Mitchell, supra note 13. See also What We Do, NCAA, http://www.nc 
aa.org/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/6V4X-K3QQ] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2019).  
 70. Id. 
 71. Infractions Phases and Parties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/de 
fault/files/EnforcementHandout%20-%20Infractions%20Phases%20and%20Part 
ies.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2XH-SCRK] (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 72. Enforcement Process: Penalties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforce 
ment/enforcement-process-penalties [https://perma.cc/K6KT-T2P3] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019). 
 73. Katherine McClelland, Should College Football’s Currency Read “In 
BCS We Trust” or Is It Just Monopoly Money?: Antitrust Implications of the Bowl 
Championship Series, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 167, 171 (2004). 
 74. Terrill L. Johnson, The Antitrust Implications of the Divisional Structure 
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 8 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. 




budgets, provide full athletic scholarships, and enroll the greatest number 
of students.75 Division II schools may award only partial athletic 
scholarships, and Division III schools may not award any athletic 
scholarships.76 Additionally, each division is subject to specific rules 
regulating the number of sports schools must sponsor and the amount and 
type of financial aid the school may award.77 In exchange for giving up 
discretion in awarding scholarships and relinquishing control over sports 
in general, the NCAA provides support to its members.78 
The NCAA’s current interpretation of its rules provides that no 
employment relationship exists between student-athletes and the NCAA 
or its member institutions.79 The NCAA’s principle of amateurism,80 
therefore, prohibits student-athletes from receiving any type of salary for 
                                                                                                             
REV. 97 (1991); Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivisional 
Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/ 
divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification 
[https://perma.cc/W3H P-3TX9] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 75. Recruiting Facts, NCAA (Mar. 2018), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/de 
fault/files/Recruiting%20Fact%20Sheet%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK7M-
TLYM]. This Comment focuses on Division I schools because they produce the 
most revenue and award the most athletic scholarships. See NCAA Finances, USA 
TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances [https://perma.cc/XSV7-CU6 
L] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 76. Parasuraman, supra note 17, at 733; Divisional Differences and the 
History of Multidivisional Classification, supra note 74. Institutions classified as 
Division I must be able to financially sponsor seven sports for men and seven 
sports for women, two of those being team sports for each gender, and are allowed 
to award full athletic scholarships. Id. Division II institutions must sponsor at least 
five sports for men and five for women, with two team sports for each gender, and 
may give partial athletic scholarships. Id. Division III institutions must sponsor 
five sports for men and five for women, with two team sports for each gender, and 
may not award any scholarships based on athletic ability. Id. 
 77. Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivisional Classification, 
supra note 74. 
 78. Id. What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources 
/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/T8L4-8NFY] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019). The NCAA provides monetary support, medical care, academic 
support services, and training opportunities to student-athletes at member 
institutions. What We Do, supra note 69. 
 79. Remy, supra note 63. 
 80. See Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 286 (7th Cir. 
2016); see also Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 
403 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (football player challenged the NCAA prohibition of paying 
student-athletes as employees under the FLSA); see generally O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 




participating in a sport.81 If student-athletes receive any extra 
compensation or benefits, they are ineligible to compete in NCAA 
athletics.82 Amateurism83 is “a bedrock principle of college athletes and 
the NCAA,”84 both ensuring that student-athletes focus on attaining a 
quality education and preserving the idea that student-athletes do not play 
for pay.85 The NCAA stresses that student-athletes are competing as 
amateur athletes and are “students first, athletes second.”86 In light of the 
current reality of the collegiate model,87 amateurism presents an area ripe 
for litigation.88 To limit the potential litigation over compensation of 
                                                                                                             
 81. Amateurism, supra note 14. Student-athletes may receive athletic 
scholarships, but may not be paid compensation similar to that which an employee 
would receive. Id. Student-athletes may not receive any employee benefits. Id. 
 82. If a student-athlete is deemed ineligible, he is not allowed to compete in 
any competitions for his respective school. Id. 
 83. See TAYLOR BRANCH, THE CARTEL: INSIDE THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
NCAA 279 (2011); see also Joshua Senne, A Review of the NCAA’s Business 
Model, Amateurism, and Paying the Players, SPORT J. (Jan. 8, 2018, 11:24 AM), 
http://thesportjournal.org/article/a-review-of-the-ncaas-business-model-amateur  
ism-and-paying-the-players/ [https://perma.cc/35D8-Q7DJ]; see also Marc 
Edelman, How Young American Athletes Can Best Challenge a Bureaucracy that 
Prevents them from Earning a Living, 9 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 135, 146 (2013). 
 84. Amateurism, supra note 14. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. “In the collegiate model of sports, the young men and women competing 
on the field or court are students first, athletes second.” Id. The reality is that 
student-athletes are now being treated as athletes first, and students second. See 
generally Shane Battier, Let Athletes be Students, PLAYERS TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2017, 
4:12 PM), https://www.theplayerstribune.com/shane-battier-ncaa-let-athletes-be-
students/ [https://perma.cc/JAT8-D759]. 
 88. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); see also Jenkins v. NCAA, 
No. 14-cv-02758-CW (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (ongoing litigation seeking the 
open-market recruitment of players and the ability to pay players what schools 
think is appropriate for players name, image, and likeness). See also Livers v. 
NCAA, 2:17-cv-04271-MMB (E.D. Penn. 2017) (a suit filed in October 2017 in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking the right of compensation under the 
FLSA for scholarship athletes that involves specific schools who employ staff 
such as trainers and coaches who “control” the student-athletes on scholarship and 
create an employment relationship). See infra Part III.A; Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Dawson v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 




student-athletes,89 the FLSA should not grant student-athletes employee 
status. Rather, the NCAA Division I member institutions should revise the 
NCAA amateurism policies to allow student-athletes compensation 
through endorsement deals. 
II. STUDENT-ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES UNDER THE NLRA, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION, AND FLSA 
Many litigants have challenged the student-athlete compensation 
rules.90 O’Bannon v. NCAA, Berger v. NCAA, and Jenkins v. NCAA are the 
most prominent cases placing the compensation of student-athletes at the 
forefront.91 Notwithstanding the increasing number of cases brought to 
challenge the status of student-athletes, courts hold consistently that 
student-athletes are not employees under any legal standard, including 
workers’ compensation, the NLRA, and the FLSA.92 
A. Student-Athletes Not Considered Employees Under Employment 
Statutes 
The NCAA contends that student-athletes are not employees within 
any definition of the NLRA.93 In 2014, the Northwestern University 
football team petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) to 
unionize as employees under the NLRA.94 The players sought to establish 
a collective bargaining agreement to regulate the “working” conditions 
and benefits of their alleged employment.95 The NLRB chose not to assert 
                                                                                                             
 89. See supra discussion Part I.A.  
 90. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049 at 1053; Jenkins, No. 14-cv-02758-CW; 
Livers, 2:17-cv-04271-MMB; Berger, 843 F.3d at 294; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d 
at 403.  
 91. See supra note 90. 
 92. Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000); 
Berger, 843 F.3d at 294; Northwestern Univ., Employer & Collegiate Athletes 
Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167, 2015 WL 4882656 (Aug. 17, 2015); see also 
Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate 
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 287, 297 (2016). 
 93. See Remy, supra note 63; see also Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the 
Future of “Athletic Labor” in College Sports, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 507 (2015). 
 94. Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL 4882656; Patrick C. Johnston, 
Northwestern Football and College Athletes: Be Careful What You Wish For, 49 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 655, 660 (2015). 
 95. Northwestern players sought to establish a Collective Bargaining 
Agreement through the players’ organization College Athletes Players 




jurisdiction in the matter, ultimately failing to address whether the players 
were employees under the NLRA.96 Had the NLRB asserted jurisdiction 
and considered the question of student-athletes employment status, 
perhaps there would be more clarity as to why classifying student-athletes 
as employees would not effectuate the policies of the NLRA and instead 
would cause instability in labor relations.97 
                                                                                                             
Association in which pay, health insurance, hours, and other conditions and 
benefits associated with employment would be established in a contractual 
agreement between the players and the university. Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL 
4882656. “Collective bargaining consists of negotiations between an employer 
and a group of employees so as to determine the conditions of employment. The 
result of collective bargaining procedures is a collective agreement. Employees 
are often represented in bargaining by a union or other labor organization.” 
Collective Bargaining, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Nov. 3, 2017, 4:20 PM), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collectivebargaining bargaining [https://per 
ma.cc/A4R5-NULR]. See generally Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete 
Players Unions: Lessons Learned from Northwestern University and Potential 
Next Steps in the College Athletes’ Rights Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627, 
1635 (2017). 
 96. To collectively bargain, the Northwestern team had to bring a claim under 
the NLRA and file it with the NLRB. The NLRB may refuse to assert jurisdiction 
over a matter that would disturb the balance of labor practices. Ben Strauss, 
N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
2017, 4:26 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-
says-northwestern-football-players-cannot-unionize.html [https://perma.cc/2VQ 
3-BWK5]; Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL 4882656. The Regional Director for 
Region 13 issued a decision in the case, finding that the University’s grant-in-aid 
scholarship football players were statutory employees under the NLRA and directed 
an election to take place on April 25, 2014. Northwestern Univ., Employer & 
Collegiate Athletes Players Ass’n, 198 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1837, 2014 WL 1246914 
(Mar. 26, 2014). Another recent NLRB decision involving Columbia University 
challenged the status of collegiate teaching students rather than student-athletes. Trs. 
of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 97. The NLRB dismissed the case on the basis “that asserting jurisdiction in 
the case would not effectuate the policies of the NLRA to promote stability in 
labor relations” and instead would create more instability by allowing student-
athletes of private institutions to unionize, but prohibiting student-athletes of 
public institutions from unionizing. Under the NLRA, only private employers are 
allowed to join unions, meaning student-athletes of private universities would be 
able to unionize, while student-athletes at public universities would be prohibited 
from unionizing. Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL 4882656; Northwestern 
University Decision, NLRB (Sept. 12, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.nlrb.gov 
/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node3034/Northwestern%20Fact%20 
Sheet%202015-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB8R-7LWS]. 




The Northwestern football team’s unionization attempt was not the 
only time student-athletes were denied employment status.98 In addition to 
rejecting the employee status of student-athletes under the NLRA, the 
NCAA also maintains that student-athletes are not employees for purposes 
of workers’ compensation.99 Even when a student-athlete has received an 
athletic scholarship, courts find that such a student-athlete is not an 
employee for the purposes of workers’ compensation because there is no 
contractual employer–employee relationship.100 
Likewise, courts have denied workers’ compensation benefits when a 
student-athlete has signed a Letter of Intent and a Financial Aid 
Agreement.101 Courts have held that the agreement to play a sport in 
exchange for financial assistance does not constitute a contract for 
employment;102 consequently, student-athletes do not receive workers’ 
compensation benefits.103  
                                                                                                             
 98. See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (1957); 
Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000); Coleman 
v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (1983). 
 99. See supra note 98. 
 100. See Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 698. Kent Waldrep, a football player at Texas 
Christian University (“TCU”) was severely injured and paralyzed while playing 
football. Id. Waldrep considered his injury a “work place accident,” filed for 
workers’ compensation, and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Id. 
The Texas Employers Insurance Association, the workers’ compensation insurer, 
appealed the award to the district court. Id. A jury concluded that Waldrep was 
not an employee of TCU when he was injured and denied him workers’ 
compensation benefits. Id. See also Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 
N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (“Scholarship recipients are considered to be students 
seeking advanced educational opportunities and are not considered to be 
professional athletes, musicians or artists employed by the [u]niversity for their 
skills in their respective areas.”). 
 101. Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 698. A National Letter of Intent is a letter a 
student-athlete signs committing him to attend a NCAA Division I or II for one 
academic year. See Recruiting, NCAA (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:17 PM), http:// 
www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/recruiting [https://perma.cc/JU4A-C6Y7]. 
A financial aid agreement is a scholarship agreement between a student-athlete 
and an institution detailing the amount of scholarship and aid the student-athlete 
will receive from the institution. Frequently Asked Questions about the NCAA, 
NCAA (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:25 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-
questions-about-ncaa [https://perma.cc/9BT2-YUKR]. 
 102. Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 700. 
 103. See generally id. 




B. Berger, Dawson, and the Compensation of Student Athletes Under the 
FLSA  
The lack of a concrete definition of employee under the FLSA creates 
uncertainty, prompting challenges as to whether student-athletes are FLSA 
employees and thus guaranteed the Act’s protections.104 Only two cases 
have asserted claims against the NCAA under the FLSA: Berger v. NCAA 
and Dawson v. NCAA.105 Berger and Dawson are the first cases 
challenging student-athletes’ right to receive a minimum wage.106 In both 
cases, the courts held that student-athletes do not qualify as employees and 
thus cannot receive the benefits the FLSA provides.107 Despite the 
consistent holdings, Berger and Dawson indicate that there may be 
potential changes regarding the compensation of NCAA Division I 
student-athletes by casting doubt on NCAA amateurism principles.108 
1. Running to the Bank: Berger v. NCAA 
In Berger, two female Division I track athletes from the University of 
Pennsylvania brought suit against the NCAA, claiming that student-
athletes are employees under the FLSA and thus entitled to minimum wage 
and overtime pay.109 The student-athletes did not receive any athletic 
scholarships because the University of Pennsylvania does not offer athletic 
                                                                                                             
 104. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern 
American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 983, 1005 (1999); see also Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 2:17-cv-04271-MMB, (E.D. Penn. 2017). 
 105. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 
2016); Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017). 
 106. This Comment specifically focuses on the compensation of NCAA 
Division I student-athletes. The recent litigation involving the compensation of 
student-athletes has been brought solely by Division I student-athletes. Berger, 
843 F.3d at 286; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 403. The pending appeal of Dawson 
v. NCAA has the potential to qualify student-athletes as employees, contradicting 
the prevailing view that student-athletes are generally not employees in any 
context. See generally Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 401, 403. 
 107. Berger, 843 F.3d at 286; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406. 
 108. Berger, 843 F.3d at 286; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 403.  
 109. The plaintiffs brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana seeking compensation based on the fact that their involvement 
and time spent on their sport constituted work for the university, rendering them 
employees and a right to be paid minimum wage and overtime. Berger, 843 F.3d 
at 286. 




scholarships.110 After examining the totality of the circumstances, the 
district court found that the student-athletes failed to establish an 
employment relationship.111 Accordingly, the court dismissed the student-
athletes’ petition for failure to state a claim, reasoning that because 
student-athletes are not employees, they are not entitled to the protections 
of the FLSA.112  
The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, requesting the court to 
use the factors the Second Circuit articulated to evaluate student-athletes’ 
status.113 The court reasoned that the Second Circuit intern “test” failed to 
capture the relationship between the plaintiffs as student-athletes and the 
university, as well as the NCAA’s tradition of amateurism.114 Rejecting 
the application of the rigid test, the Seventh Circuit opted instead for a 
more flexible approach.115 The court evaluated the economic reality of the 
relationship between the student-athletes and the university, finding that 
the evaluation of student-athletes as employees better encapsulates the 
NCAA tradition of amateurism.116  
                                                                                                             
 110. The University of Pennsylvania is consistent with all other Ivy League 
schools and does not offer athletic scholarships. Id. See also Vernon M. Strickland 
& David J. Santeusanio, Court Rules That Student-Athletes are not Employees 
Under the FLSA, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 8, 2010, 4:20 PM), https://www.lexology.com/ 
library/detail.aspx?g=7f18fe26-11cf-45bc-8b24-fdedbdae5f7e [https://perma.cc/ 
DY8H-KKCG].  
 111. Berger, 843 F.3d at 294. 
 112. Id. at 289. 
 113. Appellant Berger brought suit on behalf of herself and similarly situated 
persons. The appellant in Berger likened interns to athletes and argued that the 
factors should have been applied to determine whether student-athletes are 
employees under the FLSA. Id. at 290 (citing Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, 
Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536–37 (2d Cir. 2015)). See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37 (listing 
factors). 
 114. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 (“The multifactor test . . . simply does not take 
into account [the] tradition of amateurism or the reality of the student-athlete 
experience.”). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. See also Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“Because status as an ‘employee’ for purposes of the FLSA depends on the 
totality of circumstances rather than on any technical label, courts must examine 
the ‘economic reality’ of the working relationship between the alleged employee 
and the alleged employer to decide whether Congress intended the FLSA to apply 
to that particular relationship.”). The Seventh Circuit followed the reasoning of 
the district court and “followed the reasoning of Vanskike and held that the 
‘factors used in the trainee and private-sector intern context fail to capture the 
nature of the relationship between the Plaintiffs, as student-athletes and Penn.’” 
Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 (citing Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 808). 




The court also relied on persuasive authority from the DOL’s FOH, 
which indicates that student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA.117 
College athletics are generally recognized as extra-curricular activities in 
which participation is voluntary.118 According to the FOH, voluntary 
participation in athletics does not constitute work, and therefore, student-
athletes are not employees within the meaning of the FLSA.119 
Additionally, the court looked to legal scholarship and jurisprudence 
for guidance.120 A majority of the relevant cases held that student-athletes 
are not employees.121 Primarily citing workers’ compensation cases, the 
Seventh Circuit decided that student-athletes were not, and have not been, 
recognized as employees within any employment context, let alone under 
the FLSA.122 The court also agreed with the premise that legislation has 
consistently failed to recognize student-athletes as employees under any 
other employment statute.123 
                                                                                                             
 117. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291. The DOL FOH “is an operations manual that 
provides Wage and Hour Division . . . investigators and staff with interpretations 
of statutory provisions, procedures for conducting investigations, and general 
administrative guidance.” Field Operations Handbook (FOH), U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
(Jan. 17, 2018, 2:33 PM), https://www.dol.gov/Whd/FOH/index.htm [https://per 
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(citing Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Van Horn v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457 (1963)). 
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The majority affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the case 
and held as a matter of law that student-athletes have no legal basis for 
FLSA claims.124 Basing its decision on the NCAA principles of 
amateurism, the FOH, and the economic reality of student-athletes as 
employees,125 the court concluded that “student-athletes’ ‘play’” is 
completely voluntary and not the type of work necessary to trigger the 
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA.126 The long-
standing tradition of amateurism “shows that student athletes—like all 
amateur athletes—participate in their sports for reasons wholly unrelated 
to immediate compensation,” and play knowing they will not be paid.127 
2. Concurring but Creating Instability 
Judge David Hamilton did not agree with the entirety of the Seventh 
Circuit majority’s reasoning in Berger.128 In his concurrence, Judge 
Hamilton recognized that the student-athletes were not employees under 
the FLSA but specified that the same analysis does not necessarily apply 
to all student-athletes.129 Judge Hamilton emphasized that Berger et al. 
were non-scholarship athletes and were members of a non-revenue-
generating sport.130 Although the tradition of amateurism weighed in favor 
of dismissal, Judge Hamilton suggested that amateurism may not result in 
a dismissal of claims athletes of revenue-generating sports pursued.131 
In revenue-generating sports such as football and men’s basketball, 
Judge Hamilton continued, the economic reality should not always result 
in dismissal of claims.132 Student-athletes in those sports are more 
analogous to employees because their play is similar to employees who 
“work” and produce revenue for a business.133 Football and basketball 
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generate billions of dollars in revenue for universities;134 yet student-
athletes do not receive any of this revenue and are limited in the financial 
assistance they may receive.135 Although he explained that “there may be 
further room for debate” in cases addressing the employment status of 
student-athletes, including the possibility of granting student-athlete’s 
employment status, Judge Hamilton used the economic reality as a guide 
to cast doubt on the employment status of student-athletes.136 
3. Running with Judge Hamilton’s Concurrence: Dawson v. NCAA 
As a result of Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Berger, Lamar 
Dawson, a former NCAA Division I football player from University of 
Southern California (“USC”), initiated a class-action lawsuit against the 
Pacific-12 (“PAC-12”) Conference137 and the NCAA.138 Dawson alleged 
violations of the FLSA and a state law equivalent.139 Dawson claimed 
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See also Member Conference, NCAA (Oct. 8, 2017, 9:47 AM), http://www.ncaa 
.org/governance/membership [https://perma.cc/SCA3-HC9P]. 
 138. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403 
(N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 139. Dawson’s class action suit was brought on behalf of an “FLSA Class” of 
all “Division I FBS football players in the United States” and Dawson sought to 
establish employee status under the FLSA for the entire class. Id. See also 
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denial of pay for hours worked and overtime pay as well as failure to 
receive the appropriate minimum wage.140 Dawson further alleged that the 
NCAA and PAC-12 were “joint employers” because the NCAA 
established the rules governing student-athletes, and the PAC-12 adopted 
and carried out the NCAA’s rules.141 Further, Dawson argued that he was 
a member of a revenue-generating sport that earned “massive revenue” for 
USC, differentiating him from the plaintiffs in Berger.142 Dawson relied 
on Judge Hamilton’s Berger concurrence to support his argument that 
athletes of revenue-generating sports, like USC football, are employees 
under the FLSA.143 In response, the NCAA argued the student-athletes 
lacked standing144 and asked the District Court of Northern California to 
dismiss the suit, arguing that Dawson’s claim was based on an untenable 
legal theory.145 
The district court granted the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the suit and 
held that the student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA.146 The 
court chose, however, not to apply the Ninth Circuit’s rigid test.147 Rather, 
like the Seventh Circuit, the district court looked to the economic reality 
of the relationship between student-athletes and the school.148 The court 
held that it was unclear whether the NCAA or PAC-12 were employers 
and also unclear whether student-athletes were employees;149 that is, the 
four-factor test failed to provide an answer or assess the “true nature of the 
relationship.”150 Analyzing the true nature of the relationship led the court 
to consider NCAA amateurism when making its decision.151 
The district court’s reasoning in Dawson mirrored that of Berger—the 
court found the NCAA tradition of amateurism to be highly influential and 
important.152 The court viewed participation in athletics as completely 
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voluntary without any expectation of earning an income, relying on the 
FOH as persuasive authority.153 Dawson argued that Berger was 
distinguishable because Berger’s claim involved athletes of non-revenue-
generating sports but Dawson’s claim involved Division I football players 
who earned “massive revenues” for the school.154 Dawson heavily relied 
on Judge Hamilton’s concurrence and the idea that Berger’s broad holding 
should not necessarily extend to all student-athletes.155 Dawson further 
cited a regional decision in Northwestern in which the Northwestern 
University football players were determined to be employees under the 
NLRA.156 
Dawson argued that football should not fall into the “extracurricular 
activities” excluded from coverage in the FOH because college athletes 
play football for the economic benefit of the NCAA, which creates an 
employment relationship.157 Dawson claimed that “revenue-generating 
sports are like work-study programs” covered under the FLSA.158 After 
distinguishing between “work-study programs, which exist for the benefit 
of the school, and football programs, which exist for the benefit of students 
and, in some limited circumstances, also benefit the school,” the district 
court ultimately rejected Dawson’s argument.159 Relying on the FOH, the 
court found that interscholastic activities are primarily an educational 
opportunity provided to benefit participants and not the type of work that 
results in an employment relationship the FLSA contemplates.160 
Although Dawson argued that his generation of revenue for the school 
distinguished him from the Berger plaintiffs, the district court refused to 
accept generation of revenue as determinative of employment, thereby 
rejecting Judge Hamilton’s suggestion.161 In examining the economic 
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reality of the relationship between student-athletes and their schools, 
courts have consistently rejected the relevance of profitability.162 The 
district court determined that participation in intercollegiate athletics does 
not constitute work and that there is no difference between sports that 
generate money and those that do not.163 
Ultimately, the district court held that Division I football players have 
no legal basis to be considered employees under the FLSA and granted the 
NCAA’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend.164 Although both the 
Berger and Dawson courts determined that student-athletes are not 
employees, the question remains as to whether certain athletes—
particularly those of revenue-generating sports—should be deemed 
employees under the FLSA.165 Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Berger 
creates doubt regarding whether athletes should be employees.166 Judge 
Hamilton failed to provide a test to determine the employment status of 
student-athletes; rather, he proposed the idea that the employment 
relationship is up for debate and should be based on the factual record of 
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the case at hand.167 Ambiguity surrounding this test led to the debate in 
Dawson and will continue to prompt litigation if a court does not clarify 
whether student-athletes are employees under the FLSA.168 
III. APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC REALITY TEST TO NCAA DIVISION 
I STUDENT-ATHLETES  
The economic reality of a Division I student-athlete’s relationship 
with his respective school results in the absence of an employer–employee 
relationship and, consequently, the disqualification of the student-athlete 
as an employee under the FLSA.169 Upon review of the DOL factors 
assessing the economic reality and totality of the circumstances of the 
employment relationship, the courts in Berger and Dawson were correct 
in holding student-athletes are not employees. 
The economic reality test provides a helpful analysis to determine 
whether student-athletes should be given employee status and FLSA 
protections.170 Using the DOL’s illustrative factors for economic reality, it 
is clear that there is no employment relationship between a student-athlete 
and his school, and student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA.171  
A. The Permanency of the Relationship of Student-Athletes and Their 
Respective Schools 
The permanency and length of time one person works for another can 
help determine the existence of an employment relationship.172 A longer 
and more permanent relationship between a worker and employer suggests 
existence of an employment relationship.173 A student-athlete is limited in 
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the amount of time he may compete for his institution and does not have a 
permanent relationship with the university like an employee does.174 
For example, Division I student-athletes may compete in four seasons 
within five calendar years.175 If for some reason a student-athlete hits the 
five-year mark and has not competed in four seasons, the athlete loses that 
season of eligibility and can no longer compete.176 The relationship 
between student-athletes and their schools expires after five years or upon 
the exhaustion of their eligibility.177 
This requirement results in a short-term relationship between a 
student-athlete and his school, weighing against the existence of an 
employment relationship.178 Although temporariness can be a product of 
the industry in which a person is employed, the lack of a permanent 
relationship between student-athletes and their schools supports the 
conclusion that student-athletes are not employees.179 
B. The Amount of the Worker’s Individual Investment in Facilities and 
Equipment 
A worker’s individual investment in facilities and equipment, such as 
supplies and tools needed to complete a job, also aids in determining if a 
worker is an independent contractor or, alternatively, an employee.180 If a 
worker invests in materials or tools needed to perform a job, this generally 
indicates that he is an independent contractor.181 According to the DOL, 
“The worker [must] make some investment [compared to the employer’s 
investment] (and therefore undertake at least some risk for a loss) in order 
for there to be an indication that he or she is an independent [contractor 
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in] business [for himself or herself].”182 The fact that a worker makes an 
investment into materials, however, does not itself render him an 
independent contractor.183 
Student-athletes generally make no personal monetary investment into 
facilities or equipment needed to play or practice.184 The schools provide 
shoes, clothing, and gear needed for competition to each student-athlete.185 
In addition, student-athletes do not invest in the practice facilities, workout 
rooms, or stadiums in which they train and compete.186 
The limited amount of a student-athlete’s individual investment in 
facilities and equipment weighs in favor of student-athletes being classified 
as employees.187 Student-athletes do not have to personally invest like an 
independent contractor must.188 Nonetheless, solely providing gear to 
student-athletes does not create an employment relationship between the 
athletes and their universities.189 Student-athletes are not provided an 
employment contract, employment benefits, or other essential benefits 
considered in assessing an employment relationship.190 A student-athlete’s 
investment into facilities and equipment is not conclusive, and other factors 
should be considered to determine whether an employment relationship 
exists. 
                                                                                                             
 182. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42; see generally Chao, 16 F. App’x at 107. 
 183. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. 
 184. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Bylaw 16.8 Expenses 
Provided by the Institution for Practice and Competition, in NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL 209 (2017). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. Student-athletes should not have to invest in these items because they 
do not receive any income with which they could contribute to defray equipment 
costs. See generally Frequently Asked Questions about the NCAA, NCAA (Jan. 9, 
2018, 10:02 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-questions-about-
ncaa [http://perma.cc/9BT2-YUKR]. 
 187. See generally Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. 
 188. See generally Matthew Kish, See what your university gets from Nike, 
Adidas or Under Armour (Database), PORTLAND BUS. J. (Jan. 9, 2018, 10:14 AM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/threads_and_laces/2013/12/ database-
nike-adidas-under-armour-ncaa.html [http://perma.cc/58JG-5HN7]; see also Scott 
Cacciola, Shoes, Shirts, You Name It, College Basketball Players Get It. Free., N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018, 10:07 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/sports/ncaa 
-march-madness-shoes-adidas-nike.html [https://perma.cc/UEX4-GFVU]. 
 189. See generally Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. 
 190. Charles J. Muhl, What Is an Employee? The Answer Depends on Federal 
Law, U.S. DEP’T LAB. MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Nov. 10, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://www 
.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZG6-QMWA]. 




C. The Opportunities for the Worker to Experience Profit and Loss 
The opportunity for a person to experience—and have a direct impact 
on—a business’s profits and losses, such the ability to make critical 
business decisions, is a strong indication of an employment 
relationship.191 The opportunity to experience profits and losses focuses 
on “whether the worker exercises managerial skills and[, if so,] whether 
those skills affect [that] worker’s opportunity for both profit and loss.”192 
Student-athletes do not experience profits or losses. This factor, therefore, 
weighs in favor of student-athletes being classified as independent 
contractors and not employees.193 
Student-athletes do not make critical business decisions for a 
university athletic department and do not exercise any managerial control 
as employees of the university.194 University presidents and athletic 
directors make the business decisions that impact the profitability of an 
athletic department.195 Although student-athletes may have an effect on 
profits and losses based on their success on the field, student-athletes do 
not make any direct business decisions that would be representative of an 
employment relationship.196 As a result, student-athletes are more similar 
to independent contractors than employees. 
D. The Worker’s Skill and Initiative 
An employee or independent contractor is hired based on his ability to 
perform a job to a certain standard.197 Both independent contractors and 
employees can be highly skilled.198 A worker is more likely to be classified 
as an independent contractor when “the worker’s skills . . . demonstrate 
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that he or she exercises independent business judgment.”199 A student-
athlete is similar to an independent contractor because his skills and 
specialization allow him to make “business judgements” and use his 
talents as leverage when being recruited by schools.200 Like independent 
contractors, universities seek out student-athletes for a unique set of 
desirable skills.201 These skills give student-athletes the initiative to 
operate similarly to an independent contractor whom a school “hires” for 
his temporary duration and skill set.202 A more specialized athlete may 
receive multiple offers to play and can choose to use his skills to benefit a 
school that offers the best education and college experience.203 A highly 
specialized athlete is similar to an independent contractor who can choose 
with whom to do business.204 The high level of skill for which student-
athletes are sought out thus weighs in favor of classifying student-athletes 
as independent contractors.205 
E. The Nature and Degree of Control by the Employer 
An employer has a high degree of control over employees; he sets 
hours, stipulates pay, and controls the manner in which the work is 
performed.206 An independent contractor, in contrast, typically works 
relatively free of employer control.207 Despite this general rule, an 
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employer can control an independent contractor to some extent.208 Though 
college coaches wield great control over student-athletes and their 
schedules, this alone does not render student-athletes’ employees.209 
Control by the employer alone is not determinative of an employment 
relationship.210 
Because of the nature of collegiate athletics, college coaches have a 
considerable amount of control over student-athletes.211 Although the 
nature and degree of control weighs in favor of an employer–employee 
relationship, it fails to encompass other important realities of a student-
athlete’s relationship with his school.212 For example, student-athletes 
attend school knowing that they will be subject to certain rules and control 
by their coaches, such as mandatory study hall hours and training 
sessions.213 Coaches dictate student-athletes’ day-to-day activities, 
communicate where to be and when, and determine what needs to be 
accomplished for the student-athlete to participate in his sport.214 Student-
athletes, however, know that coaches’ control does not make them 
employees of the school.215 Further, although there is a high level of 
control of student-athletes, the control factor “does not hold any greater 
weight then the other factors.”216 Other factors—such as the NCAA rules 
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and regulations—must be considered when determining the employment 
status of student-athletes.217 
F. The Extent to Which the Work Performed is an Integral Part of the 
Employer’s Business 
The importance of an individual’s work to the success of a business 
can impact whether that individual is an employee or an independent 
contractor.218 A person is more likely to be considered an employee of a 
business when their work is integral and vital to the success of the 
business. Work is considered integral if the business’s success depends on 
the completion of the work.219 Although student-athletes provide a 
service—entertainment—the overarching goal of a university athletic 
department is to uphold the university’s commitment to education.220 
Athletic departments differ from general businesses in that their first 
priority is not to turn a profit, but rather to provide student-athletes with a 
quality educational experience that prepares them for life after college.221 
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2019); see also MSU Athletics Department Mission Statement and Core Values, 
MICH. ST. U., https://msu.edu/~msuncaa/mission.html [https://perma.cc/NX5G-
WTZJ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
 221. See generally Lindsay J. Rosenthal, From Regulating Organization to 
Multi-Billion Dollar Business: The NCAA Is Commercializing the Amateur 
Competition It Has Taken Almost a Century to Create, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT 
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Student-athletes’ “work” is not vital to the mission and overall success of 
the university because it does not further the university’s commitment to 
education.222 
Student-athletes’ work is not an integral part of the university business 
model, and therefore, student-athletes should be classified as “independent 
contractors.”223 Student-athletes’ work product is not the main service 
universities set out to provide.224 Rather, universities focus is on providing 
students a quality education.225 Participation in collegiate athletics is an added 
benefit students may enjoy, but it is not the main service that universities were 
established to provide.226 The overall analysis of the economic reality of the 
relationship between student-athletes and their schools compares student-
athletes more similarly to independent contractors than employees. 
G. Other Factors Necessary to Assess the Economic Reality 
Courts must evaluate the totality of circumstances of the working 
relationship; all facts relative “to the total activity or situation” must be 
considered when determining if student-athletes are employees.227 
Although the analysis of the economic reality factors help classify student-
athletes, other factors remain that should be addressed to clearly establish 
the presence of an employment relationship. The factors the DOL provide 
do not fully capture the relationship between student-athletes and their 
schools.228 The factors fail to take into consideration that the NCAA 
stipulates that student-athletes are not employees.229 The longstanding 
principle of amateurism, which requires that student-athletes may not 
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generally Niemeyer, supra note 217, at 887. 
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receive any type of compensation and will be deemed ineligible to play if 
they violate this rule, supports the NCAA’s stance that student-athletes are 
not employees.230 Taking this principle into consideration would represent 
a clearer picture of the totality of the circumstances when analyzing 
whether student-athletes are actually employees.231 The fact that the 
NCAA prohibits student-athletes from being paid as employees indicates 
that there is no employment relationship between the employer and 
student-athlete.232 Collegiate student-athletes voluntarily commit to play 
sports without any expectation of payment and understand they are not 
signing an employment contract with the university.233 
The economic reality of paying all Division I student-athletes 
minimum wage and overtime is something that many schools would not 
be able to financially manage,234 which is a relevant factor to address when 
determining the employment status of student-athletes. Looking at other 
factors beyond those the DOL suggests, such as the financial difficulties 
and the determination of whom gets paid and for what type of work, the 
economic realty and totality-of-circumstances tests confirm that student-
athletes are not employees.235 
IV. DEAL OR NO DEAL: PERMIT STUDENT-ATHLETES TO PURSUE 
ENDORSEMENT DEALS 
The totality of circumstances makes clear that student athletes are not 
employees; this does not mean, however, that student-athletes should not 
receive compensation. In addition to the increased costs of compensation, 
classifying student-athletes as employees would lead to an increase in 
litigation.236 To reduce the amount of litigation regarding the compensation 
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of student-athletes, a solution needs to be reached that is acceptable to all 
parties. This solution should clarify that student-athletes are not employees 
under the FLSA but are still able to receive some type of compensation. 
There are a few ways to accomplish this goal, such as amending the FLSA 
and providing athletes with trusts to access after graduation.237 Ultimately, 
the best way to limit litigation over student-athlete compensation is to allow 
student-athletes to receive endorsement deals and generate their own 
personal income.238 
A. Amend the FLSA and Develop a Concrete Definition and Test to 
Determine Who Qualifies as an FLSA Employee 
One possible way to compensate student-athletes is to amend the 
definition of employee under the FLSA. The FLSA definition is circular 
and fails to provide guidance to courts as to whom exactly should receive 
employment status under the statute.239 The statute describes an employee 
as anyone an employer employs;240 this broad definition provides little 
guidance as to what it means to be an employee.241 If the definition is 
refined to an enumerated test,242 it would be easier to determine if student-
athletes are included as employees and thus may receive the protections of 
the FLSA. Federal appellate courts have developed their own tests to apply 
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when deciding whether an individual is an employee.243 Providing a 
concrete test for all circuits to follow would create consistency and reduce 
the amount of litigation because student-athletes would know whether the 
FLSA protects them, regardless of where they file suit. 
Although amending the FLSA is a potential solution, Congress 
intentionally created a broad definition of employee because it was 
“necessary to effectuate its humanitarian goals.”244 The broad definition of 
employee does not limit coverage to a specific working relationship or 
specific people; rather, it includes many different employment relationships 
and provides rights to those deemed not to have an employment relationship 
prior to the enactment of the FLSA.245  
Amending the FLSA is an impracticable solution to decrease the 
amount of ligation involving the compensation of student-athletes without 
recognizing them as employees.246 Redefining “employee” under the 
FLSA would not provide the necessary relief within an efficient time 
period. Because the FLSA is a federal statute, Congress must make any 
amendments.247 The likelihood that Congress will take the time to amend 
the Act to clarify whether student-athletes are employees is unrealistic and 
impracticable.248 Arguably, an amendment to the FLSA could best solve 
the problem but is impracticable. 
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B. Establish Trusts for Student-Athletes to Access After Graduation and 
the Exhaustion of Eligibility 
Another possible solution to help compensate student-athletes to some 
degree is to create trusts for student-athletes. The trusts would provide 
additional monetary awards, above any scholarships a student-athlete may 
receive, after the completion of college or the exhaustion of eligibility, and 
help financially support a student-athlete. Creating trusts for student-
athletes from which to draw after college would be a reasonable 
amendment to the NCAA rules of amateurism barring the compensation 
of student-athletes.249 Creating trusts was a solution the court proposed in 
O’Bannon v. NCAA; the district court found that this “would . . . enable 
the NCAA to achieve its goals in a less restrictive manner, provided the 
compensation was limited and distributed equally among team 
members.”250 Establishing trusts creates a balance that does not completely 
eradicate the principle of amateurism. 
Trusts, however, present the same type of financial problems 
associated with student-athletes’ payment as employees.251 In O’Bannon, 
the plaintiff sought the payment of trusts up to $5,000 per year, for four 
years, for a total of $20,000.252 If universities paid every Division I 
student-athlete $5,000 per year, it would result in a total of $880,000 a 
year or $3.5 million every four years.253 Considering how few athletic 
departments generate a profit, these trusts would be very difficult for 
schools to fund directly from athletic revenue.254 Student-athlete 
compensation would have to come from outside funds, such as the 
institutions’ general fund, which is an infeasible solution to the problem.255 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected O’Bannon’s proposal to create trusts, 
finding that the NCAA would have to completely surrender its amateurism 
principles and turn a “unique brand of sport into a minor league”; the 
college sports that we know would no longer exist.256 If the trusts were 
“untethered to education” and the money had to be used to attend graduate 
school or some type of post-secondary education, the trust solution could 
work.257 But the financial ability of schools to pay all student-athletes’ 
trusts is economically infeasible.258 Instituting trusts could help with some 
alterations, but it is not the best solution to limit the ligation connected to 
the compensation of student-athletes because of the financial difficulties it 
would present universities. 
C. Amend the NCAA Amateurism Policy and Allow Student-Athletes to 
Receive Endorsements 
The third and most sensible solution to the issue of compensation is to 
allow student-athletes to pursue their own endorsement deals and revenue. 
Allowing student-athletes to profit as “self-employees” is the most 
practical solution because it does not completely abolish NCAA 
amateurism principles and provides compensation to student-athletes for 
their athletic endeavors.259 “[P]aying [student] athletes a substantial formal 
salary for their play” clearly conflicts with the NCAA principle of 
amateurism.260 Allowing student-athletes to profit on their own, however, 
does not require schools to pay athletes a formal salary; rather, allowing 
student-athletes to be “self-employed” authorizes athletes to generate their 
own sources of income.261 This solution permits a student-athlete to play 
for his own success—rather than purely for the success of the team—
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because he is compensated based on his own individual talent.262 Allowing 
student-athletes to profit on their own would require member institutions’ 
amendment to the NCAA amateurism policy.263  
1. Compensation Based Directly on Athletic Abilities and Personal 
Success 
If the NCAA allows student-athletes to profit on their own and receive 
money from other outside revenue sources, the money earned would be 
based directly on their own athletic abilities.264 As a result, universities 
would not face the issues of funding the payment of athletes as employees 
and determining whom the school should pay.265 Which students the 
school would compensate would depend solely on the performance of the 
individual athlete, removing the school from the decision. 
Student-athletes would be technically “self-employed” and earn their 
own money.266 The amount earned would be based on how successful the 
athlete is in the personal performance of his sport. As “self-employees,” 
student-athletes would be similar to individual business owners making 
profits for products they produce; student-athletes’ performances would 
be services they offer as self-employees. Amending the NCAA’s amateur 
policy to allow this practice would provide a middle ground between 
student-athletes as employees and prohibiting student-athletes from 
profiting at all.267 
2. Eliminating the Difficulty 
Determining whom the school pays, how much, and for how many 
hours would result in many administrative issues for university athletic 
departments.268 Trying to determine whether only athletes of revenue-
generating sports are employees and what activities count as “work” could 
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lead to many other subsequent problems, including lawsuits for unequal 
pay or Title IX violations.269 
Football and men’s basketball are typically the only sports that 
generate revenue for an athletic department.270 Within each team, some 
players influence more fans to attend games because of their athletic 
abilities and the excitement generated when watching them play. 
Theoretically, it would make sense to pay these players more than other 
players.271 Determining which players most positively influence 
attendance, sell the most jerseys, and cause the most season tickets to be 
sold would be very difficult for a collegiate athletic department to 
evaluate.272 Further, paying some players more than others is not a viable 
solution because it would not support team unity,273 could result in few 
athletes receiving compensation, and could cause problems with providing 
equal opportunities to female athletes.274 
3. Complying with Title IX 
In addition to eliminating the problems associated with determining 
which student-athletes to pay, allowing students to pursue their own 
endorsement deals would eliminate the problems associated with Title IX 
compliance.275 Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 
protects individuals from being discriminated against on the basis of sex 
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in any activity receiving federal funding.276 To receive federal funding, all 
schools must be in compliance with Title IX.277 To comply, an institution 
must provide equal opportunities and funding to members of both sexes.278 
If student-athletes of Division I revenue-generating sports are employees 
under the FLSA, schools will be burdened with complying with Title IX 
because men’s sports, such as football and basketball, typically are the 
only sports that generate revenue for a school.279 
Paying student-athletes as “self-employees” allows student-athletes to 
be paid at “the fair market value of their services” and does not violate 
Title IX.280 Because the compensation comes from private individuals and 
businesses, not directly from the institution, there is no requirement to 
award males and females equal funding.281 If a player is very talented, he 
or she has an equal opportunity to profit and receive endorsement deals 
based on his or her athletic abilities, regardless of gender.282 Self-
employment of student-athletes would generate opportunities for both 
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males and females to seek their own endorsement deals on an equal 
playing ground.283 
Allowing student-athletes to seek endorsements allows both men and 
women to pursue opportunities based on their own personal athletic 
performance. Additionally, it may provide an opportunity for women to 
make money that they may not have had otherwise.284 Professional female 
athletes have proven they are marketable and can receive endorsement deals 
like professional male athletes.285 Like their professional counterparts, 
female collegiate athletes could take advantage of this opportunity to pursue 
their own endorsement deals, receiving compensation in the process. 
Permitting all athletes to profit on their own would relieve schools from the 
challenges of paying athletes and compliance with Title IX and provide all 
student-athletes with the opportunity to generate money, not just those in 
revenue-generating sports. 
4. Student-Athletes Unable to Generate Income to Support 
Themselves 
Because of their demanding schedules, student-athletes are not able to 
hold jobs like other students.286 Permitting student-athletes to receive 
endorsements would allow student-athletes to generate income needed to 
support themselves during and after college. Some student-athletes are 
financially unstable and incapable of working because of their demanding 
schedules.287 For example, NCAA Division I football players “dedicate an 
average of 43.3 hours per week to their sport.”288 They do not have enough 
time to work a job, go to school, and participate in a Division I sport.289 
Football players at Division I schools who receive a cost of attendance 
stipend often use that money to pay for groceries, rent, car repairs, and 
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even send money home to support families.290 Most of the reported uses 
of the stipends are spent on basic and essential expenses needed to live.291 
Through endorsement deals, student-athletes could earn income they 
otherwise would not be able to generate.292 All other students who attend 
college have the opportunity for employment and generate income; 
student-athletes should not be denied the same opportunity.293 
Student-athletes should not be limited in their efforts to make money to 
financially support themselves. Most student-athletes attend college with 
hopes of playing professionally, but the reality is that many do not and 
instead leave college without any financial means to support themselves.294 
The NCAA estimates that only 1.5% of college football players and 1.1% 
of college basketball players will play professionally.295 Many athletes who 
do not play professionally have a hard time adjusting to life after college 
because all they have known for four-to-five years is the daily activities 
required of the sport.296 The post-college adjustment can involve depression, 
financial difficulties, and other serious problems.297 The majority of players 
receive a degree and are able to get a job after college, but others leave 
college with no job and no financial means to support themselves.298 Self-
employment of student-athletes would help reduce the number of students 
who leave school without financial support. Granting student-athletes the 
ability to be “self-employed” and receive endorsement deals provides a 
practical and rational means for allowing student-athletes to receive some 
type of compensation without completely destroying NCAA amateurism.299 
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Berger and Dawson have created uncertainty in classifying student-
athletes as employees under the FLSA.300 Allowing student-athletes to be 
employees would produce many negative consequences member 
institutions would not be equipped to handle, such as financial challenges 
and difficulties in complying with Title IX.301 Collegiate athletics would 
not be able to operate in the same way that it has for years, and total reform 
would be required.302 Although student-athletes should not be classified as 
employees under the FLSA, they should be able to make money on their 
own through endorsements and outside revenue sources. Allowing 
student-athletes to do so would provide an equal opportunity to all student-
athletes to produce their own revenue based on personal athletic 
endeavors. Modifying the NCAA amateurism rules to accommodate “self-
employment” creates a solution that is attractive to the NCAA, member 
institutions, and student-athletes. The litigation involving the 
compensation of student athletes indicates the need for change within the 
NCAA legislation and governance of Division I athletics.303 The NCAA 
must modernize its amateurism bylaws and adapt to the collegiate model 
so that players are compensated for their athletic endeavors. 
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endorsements he can accept. For example, only allowing an athlete to receive 
money once he commits to an institution would help with the recruiting concerns 
that could arise when giving certain athletes endorsements to attend a certain 
school. In addition, limiting the amount of endorsements students-athletes may 
receive would help to make sure that student-athletes do not shift too much of 
their focus away from the classroom and toward the playing field. Parrish, supra 
note 265. 
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